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Abstract 
 
Using dynamic panel System GMM for 24 EMs over the period 1990-2018, we analyze 
how changes in sovereign ratings affect FDI inflows to EMs. The study also estimates the 
contagion effect of a ratings change among any of the BRICS countries on three regions, 
Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) and Latin America and Asia. Third, we 
estimate the impact of a ratings change on FDI inflows in the presence of two types of 
crises, the 2007-2009 global financial crisis as well as country-specific crises. The results 
suggest that sovereign ratings have a statistically significant impact on the flow of FDI to 
EMs and that the BRICS countries as a bloc exert a statistically significant contagion 
impact on the FDI inflows into the three regions examined. We also find that the impact of 
sovereign ratings change on FDI inflows increases in crisis times, both country-specific, as 
well as the global financial crisis.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Total gross FDI inflows averaged around 40-60% of aggregate capital flows to EMs since 
the mid-1990s. FDI flows to EMs surged from an average of US$40 billion annually in the 
early 1990s to US$300 billion per year in the mid-2000s (Koepke, 2015). Among EMs, the 
BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) arose as major recipients 
of FDI inflows, and by 2012, FDI inflows into them have reached 20% of total FDI, a more 
than three-fold increase relative to 6% in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2013)3 and sharing 2% of the 
world’s FDI inflows in 2019 (UNCTAD, 2019) as shown in Figure 1. 
Despite the recurring EM crises in the 1990s, capital flows into EMs continued to rise until 
the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. With the “Great Retrenchment” that followed, the 
effects were temporary for EMs relative to advanced economies.   In fact, capital inflows 
to EMs witnessed a speedy recovery, especially to the BRICS countries, which possibly 
bringing FDI close to the pre-crisis levels.4 
 
Figure (1): FDI Inflows in BRICS, and their Share in Global FDI 
 
                         Source: UNCTAD (2019) 
 
                                               
3 One of the most significant episodes of FDI inflows to BRICS occurred over the period 2003-2008 when FDI inflows grew from USD 
77 bn  to USD 281 billion. China and Russia accounted for the largest share (UNCTAD, 2013).  
4 See Bussiere et. Al. (2016) for more information. Since 2010, however, cross-border financial flows reached a “new average,” below 
5% of GDP.  
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Many reasons are behind the rise in capital flows to EMs over the last two decades, 
particularly since the onset of the global financial crisis, low interest rates, unconventional 
monetary policies in advanced economies. This made investments in EMs more attractive,5 
in addition to the stronger economic growth of EMs relative to advanced economies. The 
information provided by credit rating agencies (CRAs) on a country's creditworthiness has 
made it easier for investors to differentiate between countries when determining their 
investment decisions and accordingly the presence of CRAs has been another reason 
highlighted behind the rise in capital inflows into EMs. Emara and El Said (2015) held that 
the increase in the number of rated countries over time helped increase countries’ ability 
to raise funds at lower costs through accessing international capital markets. 6  
Given the repeated EMs defaults and crises since the 1990s, in addition to the 2007-
2009 global financial crisis, CRAs have repeatedly come under scrutiny and a belief that 
CRAs have helped in deepening crises.7  The role of sovereign ratings in stimulating EMs' 
access to international capital markets implies that FDI inflows respond to rating changes 
(see Emara and El Said, 2015). This response could also be contagious in crisis periods, 
particularly if the ratings change occurs in one of the big EMs or BRICS that absorb a 
significant bulk of FDI inflows. 8  
FDI inflows showed the most resilience to changes in global conditions in the last 
two decades and are relatively less volatile than other types of capital flows.9  The aim of 
the study is to analyze how the sovereign ratings upgrades and downgrades affects FDI 
inflows to EMs and whether a sovereign ratings’ change in another region explains the 
changes in FDI flows in a region. It also examines whether the presence of a crisis, country-
specific or otherwise affects the impact of sovereign rating on FDI. The focus on FDI 
reflects the fact that it has been less volatile than other types of capital flows in the last two 
decades. 10   
                                               
5 See for example Fernandez-Arias (1996) and Montiel and Reinhart, (1999). 
6 For more information on the effects of sovereign ratings on investment flows in EMs, see Fitch (2014).  
7 For more information on the instability of EM crises, see Calvo (1998). 
8 This could even be the case despite the fact that FDI contracted the least- relative to other types of EM capital inflows (Koepke, 
2015).  
9 See for example Bluedorn, J., Duttagupta, R., Guajardo, J., Tapolova, P. (2013) and UNDP (2013). 
10 Bank flows, for instance, which accounted for the principal portion of the total capital flows prior to 2008, have plunged while, FDI 
flows were hardly impacted, to account for almost 45% of global flows in 2015/2016 (Bussiere et. Al., 2016).  
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More specifically, the study aims at answering the following questions: How do 
sovereign rating changes affects FDI inflows to EMs? Can changes in FDI flows in one 
country be explained by a sovereign rating change in other countries? For the latter 
question, we focus on ratings changes among the BRICS countries and whether there is a 
contagion effect to EMs in three other regions: Latin America, Asia, and Central and 
Eastern Europe, Middle East, and Africa (CEEMEA).   The rest of this paper is divided as 
follows; section II reviews the relevant literature, section III explains the data used, section 
IV covers the estimation methodology, section IV documents our results, and section V 
concludes. The appendix appears at the end of the paper and includes the regression tables 
and explanation of the sovereign rating variable. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on sovereign ratings, capital flows in general, and FDI in particular, as well 
as contagion, is quite large and gained importance after the 1994 Mexican financial crisis, 
as highlighted in Emara and El Said (2015). Cantor and Packer (1996) were among the 
pioneers showing that CRAs provide more information about speculative grade sovereigns 
than publicly available sources. The study by Reinhart (2002) and Kraussl (2003) 
emphasized on the importance of sovereign credit ratings for EMs because their volatile 
nature can affect their accessibility to international capital markets. Below, we highlight 
the literature on the main determinants of capital flows, with a focus on FDI, and then 
follow with the literature on sovereign ratings, and financial contagion.  
 
Determinants of Capital Flows 
A vast amount of literature focus on the push factors, or external factors, as determinants 
of capital flows. These push factors normally include GDP growth and interest rates in 
advanced economies, particularly U.S. interest rates (Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart , 
1993; Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 1995; Fernandez-Arias, 1996; Calvo and Reinhart, 
1996, and Chuhan et al., 1998) and global risk aversion (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011).11 
On the other hand, pull factors, or country-specific factors, encompass factors such as 
                                               
11 This is particularly the case for pull factors.  
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economic performance and market size, proxied by a country’s GDP growth rate (Dasgupta 
and Ratha 2000, and Hernandez, Mellado and Valdes 2001), inflation rates (Ahn et al. 
1998), and the stability of exchange rate (Lopez-Mejia 1999). Hernandez, Mellado and 
Valdes (2001) found that the most important factor affecting the country’s private capital 
flows is its individual characteristics such as economic growth, inflation, and current 
account deficit. and Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2005) found that the level of 
institutional quality is an important factor affecting capital flows.  Koepke (2016) 
highlights that these variables are more cyclical in nature, short-term, and differ across the 
varying phases of the business cycle. Other push and pull factors are more structural and 
long term in nature. Such push factors include portfolio diversification, information and 
communication technology, the rise of institutional investors, while such pull factors 
include quality of institutions, quality of institutions, and the role of government in an 
economy (Koepke, 2016).  
 
Determinants of FDI 
Research focusing on the determinants of FDI12 have been broadly in line with the findings 
above. FDI was found to be mainly affected by long-term factors governing the real 
economy, such as market size13 (Dunning, 1993; Garibalidi et. Al., 2002), more than by 
short-term financial- and external- fluctuations. Within a push-pull factor framework, 
domestic output growth has been largely undisputed as one of the leading determinants of 
FDI inflows (Koepke, 2015; Gastanaga et al., 1998; Hernandez et al. 2001; De Vita and 
Kyaw 2008). 14  Addison and Heshmati (2003) also found that trade openness and 
democracy positively affect FDI, while the level of perceived risk and indebtedness 
adversely affects it.   
Other pull factors that exert a significant and positive impact on FDI inflows 
include low government consumption as a share of GDP,15 low fiscal deficit (Albuquerque 
et al. 2005; Garibalidi et. Al., 2002), low inflation rate (Walsh and Yu, 2010; Garibalidi et. 
                                               
12 We are concerned with macro/country-level/exogenous determinants in this chapter. For more information on firm-specific FDI 
determinants, see Blonigen (2005).  
13 Proxied by GDP growth, or GDP per capita.  
14 Gupta and Ratha (2000) perhaps is an exception, finding that GDP growth had no significant effect on FDI flows. 
15 Proxy for the size of the government in the economy 
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Al., 2002),16 and weak currency (Blonigen, 1997). Relatedly, Abbott et al. (2012) found 
that EMs employing fixed exchange rate regimes preserving currency stability—receive 
more FDI with flexible exchange rates. Low levels of bureaucracy and corruption also had 
positive impact on FDI inflows (Gastanaga et al 1998; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2006). 
However, it is important to note that FDI inflows are less affected relative to portfolio 
inflows by information frictions and institutional quality (Daude and Fratzscher, 2008).17 
Similarly, the only economic reforms that have played a significant role in driving FDI 
inflows in Latin America over the period 1980-1996 are trade and financial liberalization 
and limiting the risk of expropriation (Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2006).18  
A number of studies have also focused on the role of capital controls as a pull factor 
and their impact on FDI. Asiedu and Lien (2004) found that the impact of capital controls—
restrictions on the capital account, repatriation of export proceeds, and the presence of 
several exchange rates—on FDI varied by region and changed over time. Since the 1990s, 
all three types of capital controls have had a significant impact on FDI, with the greatest 
adverse effect in East Asia and Latin America. Elo (2007) find that increasing capital 
controls decreases the duration of FDI investments at specific levels of country risk. This 
is quite relevant as it relates to how FDI responds to capital controls in an environment of 
changing country risk.19  Dell’Erba and Reinhardt (2015) focused on financial sector FDI 
inflows,and found that capital controls increased the probability of increases in financial 
sector FDI.  
As for push factors, Koepke (2015) held that push factors mattered the least for FDI 
but given the interest in global risk aversion with the onset of the global financial crisis, a 
number of studies have examined the impact of changes in global risk aversion on FDI 
inflows.20 Most of these studies have had mixed results. Rey (2015) found a positive 
correlation between the VIX and FDI inflows21 into EMs, while Milesi-Ferretti and Tille 
(2011)22 found that global risk aversion has a negative impact on FDI however the impact 
                                               
16 Although they found that this mattered more for advanced economies relative to EMs. 
17 both debt and equity  
18 Tax reforms, privatizations, international capital liberalization, and regime type were not found to be significant determinants of FDI.  
19 Moody’s sovereign ratings were among their measures for country risk. 
20 Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) held that a risk aversion shock tends to affect capital flows through two main channels; 1) re-
assessment of risk, which causes capital flight from more vulnerable economies; and 2) investment contraction and lower global trade.  
21 But it was significantly negatively associated with fluctuations in other types of capital inflows. 
22 They also examined capital flow retrenchment. 
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is smaller when compared to other types of capital flows.  Albuqerque (2005) found no 
relationship between FDI and global risk aversion.  
Further work examined output growth in advanced economies as a push factor but 
have been inconclusive. De Vita and Kyaw (2008) obtained mixed results,23 depending on 
the model employed, while Gupta and Ratha (2000) found no significant impact. 
Albuquerque et al. (2005 and 2002) found both a negative and positive24 relationship, 
respectively, between global growth and FDI into EMs, but found that asset return 
indicators have no impact on FDI inflows because of their long-term nature, given FDI’s 
lack of volatility. World Bank (1997) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2003) found that asset 
return volatility discourages FDI.  
Using fixed effects approach, the study of Reinhardt, Ricci, and Tressel (2013) 
found that in financially open economies, less developed EMs usually have net capital 
inflows.25  This result applied for FDI when capital flows are disaggregated, as well.  
Albuquerque (2005) found that global factors are more important than domestic factors in 
determining the variations in FDI flows.  Forbes (2012) held that countries are more prone 
to contagion if they are more dependent on trade (relative to GDP) and have banking 
systems that are leveraged, but are not prone to contagion simply if they have larger capital 
inflows.  Using SURs, Forbes and Warnock (2012) found that variability in global risk is 
statistically significantly related with variability in capital flow. The study also found 
minimal links between capital controls and the probability of capital flows surging or 
stopping. 
As for contagion, Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1997), and Glick and Rose 
(1999) found that trade links are the main channels through which financial crises become 
contagious.26 In a panel study on Latin American countries, Chuhan, Claessens, and 
Mamingi (1993) found that bond flows were more responsive than equity flows to any 
change in country’s credit rating.  Soon after, Calvo and Reinhart (1996) found evidence 
of “large neighbor effects” on capital flows to and from Latin America from 1970 to 1993.  
                                               
23 A SVAR context yielded a positive relationship, but in alternative specifications, they found a negative but insignificant relationship.  
24 The positive relationship was mainly related to vertical FDI flows, that is, investments related to an integrated international supply 
chain that meets external demand (Koepke, 2015), whereas horizontal FDI to be affected more by pull factors/macroeconomic 
fundamentals. 
25 More advanced economies experienced net capital outflows. 
26 For more information on the literature that surveyed contagion, see Emara and El Said (2015).  
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One of the most recent studies that attempt to capture sovereign ratings, capital flows, and 
contagion was that of Chen et. al (2016), who studied the impact of a sovereign rating 
changes and found that due to financial and trade linkages any rating revisions lead to 
significant output spillover effects within the same quarter of the ratings change. The 
authors attribute spillovers to both direct and indirect financial and trade linkages between 
event and non-event countries.  
Country-specific studies on the impact of sovereign ratings and FDI showed that a 
positive relationship between FDI inflows and ratings upgrades in the case of Turkey 
(Bayar and Kilic, 2014) and Romania (Popa, 2012), while rating downgrades in South 
Africa adversely affect FDI inflows (Mugobo and Mutize, 2016). 
 
III. DATA27 
The study analyzes the impact of a set of pull factors and a set of push factors on the flow 
of FDI to a sample of EMs. The data set includes 24 EMs over the period 1990-2018, where 
table 1 provide a list of countries in our sample.  
                                  Table 1 –List of EMs included in the Sample 
1 Argentina  13 Malaysia 
2 Brazil  14 Mexico 
3 Chile 15 Peru 
4 China 16 Philippines   
5 Columbia 17 Poland 
6 Czech Republic 18 Russia 
7 Egypt 19 Singapore 
8 Greece 20 South Africa 
9 Hong Kong 21 South Korea 
10 Hungary 22 Thailand 
11 India  23 Turkey 
12 Indonesia 24 Venezuela  
 
The dependent variable in the model is FDI (as a percent of GDP) and the set of 
independent variables consists of the current account balance as a percent of GDP, the real 
interest rate, inflation rate, real GDP growth rate, Standard and Poor's sovereign ratings, 
                                               
27 The data that support the findings of this study are openly available in the World Bank Database at 
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators. 
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the weighted average of the G-728 real GDP growth rate, and the weighted average of the 
G-7 real interest rate. The data set is extracted from the World Development Indicators of 
the World Bank’s database. 
Table 2 provides a detailed list of the variables used, definition, unit of 
measurement, and data source. 
 
Table 2 Definitions of Variables 
Variable Name 
Definition 
Unit of 
Measurement 
Data Source 
Foreign direct 
investment, net 
inflows (% of 
GDP) 
The sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, 
other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown 
in the balance of payments. This series shows net 
inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in 
the reporting economy from foreign investors, and is 
divided by GDP.  
 
Percent of GDP 
World 
Development 
Indicators. 
Sovereign debt 
rating 
The capacity and willingness of a government to meet its 
obligations in full and on time. It is the risk facing an 
investor who holds debt securities issued by that 
government which in turn reflects its credit worthiness. 
AAA = 24, 
AA+ = 23,.., D 
= 129 
Standard & 
Poor website. 
 
Inflation 
 
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index 
reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the 
average 
 
Annual Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators. 
Real Interest Rate The lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the GDP deflator. 
 
Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators. 
Current Account 
Balance (% of 
GDP) 
The sum of net exports of goods and services, net primary 
income, and net secondary income. 
 
Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators. 
Growth of real 
per capita GDP 
Growth rate of real GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$).   
Annual Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators. 
G-7 real GDP 
growth rate 
Weighted average by GDP per capita of real GDP per 
capita for the G-7 countries. (Authors’ computation.) 
 
Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators. 
G-7 real interest 
rate 
Weighted average by GDP per capita of real GDP per 
capita for the G-7 countries. (Authors’ computation.) 
 
Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators. 
Capital Controls 
Index 
An index which includes restrictions on equity flows, 
bond flows, money markets, collective investments, local 
purchases by non-residents, purchases abroad by 
residents, and others. 
Index Fernandez et. 
Al. (2015).  
 
 
 
 
                                               
28 France, Canada, Italy, Germany, U.S., U.K. and Japan. 
29AAA, AA+, AA, AA-, A+, A, A-, BBB+, BBB, BBB-, BB+, BB, BB-, B+, B, B-, CCC+, CCC, CCC-, CC, C, RD, SD, D.  For detailed 
definition on each rating classification check S&P website https://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/article/-
/view/sourceId/504352. 
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V. MODEL SPECIFICATION & METHODOLOGY 
 
The first part of the estimation methodology examines the impact of changes in sovereign 
debt ratings on the flow of FDI as a percent of GDP. Second, we analyze the possible 
contagion effect from the BRICS countries to other EMs in the sample. Third, the 
contagious effect of each of the five BRICS countries on three regions namely Asian30, 
EMEA31, and Latin American32 countries are analyzed. Finally, the study analyzes the 
effect of the changes in rating on the flow of FDI in the presence of two types of crises; 
global financial crisis of 2007 and country’s crisis. 
To perform the first part of the model specification, the following dynamic panel 
regression model examines the impact of changes in sovereign debt ratings on the flow of 
FDI (as a percent of GDP33),  
!"#$,& = α + 	ρ!"#$,&,- + 	βX0,1,- + δZ0,1,- 	+ λR0,1,- +	ε0,1															(1)	
	 	 																										i	=	1,	2,…N,	t	=	1990,…T	
 
Where FDIit denotes the ratio of net inflows from foreign investors to GDP, of country i at 
time t, FDIit-1 is the AR(1) endogenous variable,  Xit-1 is the vector of pull factors, Zit-1 is 
the vector push factors, Rit-1 is the sovereign debt rating, and εit is the error term of the 
regression.  
The vector of pull factors includes the current account balance as a share of GDP, 
the real interest rate, inflation rate, real GDP growth rate, current account as a share of 
GDP, and Standard and Poor's sovereign debt ratings where the change in the rating is as 
defined in Gande and Parsley (2003). The vector of push factors contains two variables 
namely the weighted average of the G-7 real GDP growth rate and the weighted average 
of the G-7 real interest rate.  
                                               
30  Asian region includes nine countries namely China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
and Thailand. 
31 Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region includes eight countries namely Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Russia, South Africa, and Turkey. 
32 Latin America region includes seven countries namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. 
33 To control for country size. 
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The FDI model is estimated using dynamic panel System GMM proposed by Arellano 
and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), and Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000). 
This methodology combines together Equation (1) with Equation (2) below, 
 
B!"#$,& − !"#$,&,-D
= α + 	ρB!"#$,&,- − !"#$,&,ED + 	βBX0,1,- − X0,1,ED + δ(Z0,1,- − δZ0,1,E) 									
+ λ(R0,1,- − R0,1,E) +	(ε0,1 − ε0,1,-	)																																																											(2) 
 
where the additional moments conditions for the equation in levels are as follows,  
FG△ !"#$,&I$,&J = 0, !KL	M = 2,… , N	
																			FG△ O$,&I$,&J = 0, !KL	M = 2,… , N																																								(3)	
 
where is the set of all the explanatory variables of Equation (1) except the push factors, 
Zi,t.  
Using dynamic panel regression model, the following model is estimated to analyze 
how moving from a speculative rating grade to an investment grade affects the flow of FDI 
to EMs. The model is estimated by adding a dummy variable for rating, "Q$,&,-,	that takes 
1 for investment grade and 0 for speculative grade, as shown in Equation (4) where a 
speculative grade is defined as a rating of BBB- or below34. 
															!"#$,& = α + 	ρ!"#$,&,- + 	βX0,1,- + δZ0,1,- 	+ λDR0,1,- +	ε0,1																																											(4) 
 
Next, the following model is formed and used to estimate the contagion effect from 
the BRICS countries to other EMs in the sample, 
																			!"#$,& = T + 	U!"#$,&,- + 	VW$,&,- + XY$,&,- 	+ Z[Q\,&,-
]
\^-
+	I$,&													(5) 
 
where the dependent variable, vectors of push and pull factors are the same as before while 
replacing the rating variable with the weighted average of the BRICS countries’ rating 
controlled for country size and denoted by the variable ∑ Q\,&]\^-  . This variable is used to 
                                               
34 See linear transformation table in Appendix II. 
M
i,t
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estimate the extent to which a sovereign ratings downgrade (upgrade) in the BRICS 
countries affects FDI to flow out of (into) other EMs in the sample. In addition, the study 
analyzes the contagious effect of each of the five BRICS countries on three regions namely 
Asian35, EMEA36, and Latin American37 countries. To do so, Equation (5) is estimated for 
each of the five BRICS countries in a turn to test the extent to which rating changes affect 
the flow of FDI in the three regions namely Asia, EMEA, and Latin America. 
The last part of the methodology analyses the impact of the changes in ratings on 
the flow of FDI in the presence of two types of crises; the global financial crisis and 
country’s specific crisis by adding a dummy variable D0,1 to the model, as shown in 
Equation (6), to account for the two types of crises each one in a turn. For instance, to 
account for the global financial crisis the dummy variable takes 1 for the years 2007 to 
2009 and zero otherwise and to account for country’s specific crisis the dummy variable 
takes 1 for country i at time t of the crisis and zero otherwise.   
															!"#$,& = α + 	ρ!"#$,&,- + 	βX0,1,- + δZ0,1,- 	+ λR0,1,- + θD0,1,- 
																																																																+ϑ(D0,1,- ∗ R0,1,-) +	ε0,1																																											(6) 
 
The total effect of a crisis, whether global financial crisis or country’s crisis, is 
estimated by adding up the coefficient e to the coefficient f and their statistical significance 
is determined by from their variances and covariance of the variables D0,1,- and R0,1,-. 
 
V. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Using the Arellano-Bond System GMM estimation methodology, the model is estimated 
under nine specifications where FDI is regressed on the set of independent variables.  This 
estimation methodology is best at dealing with simultaneous causality and possible 
correlation between country’s fixed effects and the set of explanatory variables.The set of 
instruments used in the model is valid. More specifically, the set of instruments passed the 
                                               
35  Asian region includes nine countries namely China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
and Thailand. 
36 Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region includes eight countries namely Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Russia, South Africa, and Turkey. 
37 Latin America region includes seven countries namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. 
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relevance test and the overidentification test as computed by the Hansen test and its p-
value.  
Table 3 shows the estimation results of the FDI model, where our results build 
further on Emara and El Said (2015)38 by including a capital controls index among our set 
of explanatory variables while testing for the impact of sovereign ratings changes on FDI.  
Column (1) confirms that the AR(1) term is positive and statistically significant as 
expected. In Column (2), when the lagged GDP growth rate is added to the regression, the 
coefficient of the lagged FDI remains positive and statistically significant. The results of 
this column show that the coefficient of GDP growth is also significant where a one percent 
increase leads to about 0.20 percent (of GDP) increase in FDI. Once again, this confirms 
the literature that held that domestic output growth is one of the leading determinants of 
FDI flows, as shown by Gastanaga et al. (1998), Hernandez et al. (2001), and Koepke 
(2015).  
In Column 3 (Table 3), the lagged sovereign ratings variable is added to the 
regression, where a one notch rating upgrade results in about 0.19 percent (of GDP) 
increase in FDI. The coefficients on lagged FDI and GDP growth remained statistically 
significant after the addition of ratings, as our main variables of interest. To our knowledge, 
few studies have focused mainly on the link between FDI and sovereign ratings, but our 
results are in line with those of Kim and Wu (2008), who found that an improvement in 
sovereign ratings increases FDI into EMs.  
 
                                               
38 Selected results from Emara and El Said (2015) will be highlighted.   
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Table 3: Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Rating 
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
          
FDI it-1 0.507*** 0.536*** 0.422*** 0.420*** 0.427*** 0.428*** 0.401*** 0.411*** 0.412*** 
 (0.174) (0.161) (0.146) (0.144) (0.142) (0.140) (0.130) (0.126) (0.125) 
GDP Growth it-1  0.202** 0.128 0.169* 0.175* 0.176* 0.231** 0.159 0.124 
  (0.0872) (0.0793) (0.0927) (0.103) (0.0945) (0.105) (0.106) (0.0857) 
Rating it-1   0.188*** 0.198*** 0.212*** 0.214*** 0.316*** 0.313*** 0.325*** 
   (0.0519) (0.0566) (0.0609) (0.0699) (0.0867) (0.0846) (0.0934) 
Inflation it-1    -0.000711*** -0.0235* -0.0236* 0.0255 0.0218 0.0384 
    (0.000204) (0.0123) (0.0126) (0.0265) (0.0282) (0.0384) 
Real Interest Rate it-1     -0.00040 -0.00114 0.00329 -0.0185 -0.0102 
     (0.0162) (0.0193) (0.0203) (0.0309) (0.0295) 
Current Account it-1      -0.0103 -0.0673 -0.0547 -0.0546 
      (0.0896) (0.0979) (0.0903) (0.0899) 
Capital Control Index it-1       -0.0405** -0.0424** -0.0395** 
       (0.0185) (0.0187) (0.0169) 
G-7 Growth it        0.368* 0.458* 
        (0.189) (0.236) 
G-7 Real Interest it         -0.180 
         (0.162) 
          
Observations 648 648 597 536 479 479 433 433 433 
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 23 23 23 23 23 
Arellano-Bond Test          
Order 1 p-value 0.0896 0.0883 0.0863 0.0919 0.0948 0.0951 0.0939 0.0951 0.0943 
Order 2 p-value 0.1701 0.1875 0.2262 0.2251 0.2297 0.2257 0.2472 0.2292 0.2223 
Hansen p-value  0.280 0.494 0.444 0.196 0.207 0.645 0.279 0.441 
 Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
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Column 4 shows the regression whereby inflation is included as a proxy for 
macroeconomic stability (Walsh and Wu, 2010). The coefficient of the lagged inflation 
rate shows an expected negative and statistically significant impact on FDI, where a 1 
percent increase in inflation leads to 0.001 percent drop in FDI. While this is a small 
coefficient, this result is suggestive of a link between inflation and FDI inflows are linked, 
while when other studies found no significant link, even at the 10% level (see Arbatli, 2011 
for example). Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 shows that adding the lagged real interest 
rate and lagged current account balance as a percent of GDP do not have a statistical 
significant impact on FDI, highlighting the fact that market size matters more in our 
sample, even though we expect a positive relationship between real interest rates and FDI 
(Addison and Heshmati, 2003).39 The insignificant result of the current account balance in 
Column (6) aligns with the literature on the non-robust evidence between widening current 
account deficit as a measure of increased financial need (or as a measure of country risk) 
and the different types of capital flows in EMs (Koepke, 2015). 
When we add the lagged capital controls index to the regression in Column 7, our 
results show that a one-unit increase in this index leads to a drop in FDI of around 0.041 
percent of GDP, an expected result, at the five percent significance level. This is in line 
with Asiedo and Lien (2004), who show that capital controls adversely affect FDI, with the 
results most significant during the 1990s relative to the 1970s and 1980s. Elo (2007) also 
found similar results whereby more capital controls decreases the duration of FDI 
investments at specific levels of country risk.40 It is important to note that Column 6 of 
Table 3 from Emara and El Said (2015) displays the results without the capital controls 
index where we can see that the coefficient of GDP growth is more than double (0.547) 
that of Table 3 in the presence of capital controls.   
As of Column 8, we introduce our push factors into the model, whereby we add the 
weighted average of the G-7 real GDP growth rate to the regression, which shows a 
                                               
39 Our portfolio results in Emara and El Said (2015) also show that real interest rates, as well as the (nominal) policy 
rates were not a significant determinant of portfolio inflows, but the interest rate differential- in nominal terms- mattered. 
[More importantly, there little evidence of a link between the current account balance and FDI in this context, although 
Fry et al. (1995) held that a large current account deficit could worsen a country’s investment climate, thereby adversely 
affecting FDI. 
40 Elo’s country risk parameter was financial distress. Other than through decreasing durations, FDI investors may decide 
not to enter at all into the results of that study.  
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statistically significant robust impact on net FDI inflows to EMs. In  Column 9 our second 
push factor, the G-7 real interest rate shows an insignificant effect on net FDI inflows to 
EMs.41 This result aligns with the majority of the literature, which finds an unclear 
relationship between interest and FDI in EMs (World Bank, 1997; Montiel & Reinhard, 
1999; Hernandez, Mellado & Valdes, 2001; De Vita & Kyaw, 2008; Koepke, 2015), and 
that pull factors mattered more for FDI.42 
For all regressions, the Arrelano-Bond test fails to reject the presence of serial 
correlation of order 1 but rejects it for order 2. And the Hansen test confirms that the 
overidentifying restrictions are correctly specified 
Table 4 shows more parsimonious models of the impact of ratings on FDI. Column 1 of 
the table shows the full model with all regressors included. Column 2 reports the results 
for a smaller model where the three insignificant regressors in Table 3 – inflation, real 
interest rate, and current account – are removed from the regression. The results show no 
significant change in the coefficients of the remaining variables in terms of signs and 
statistical significance. The third specification (Column 3) shows the model with excluding 
only the capital control index from the regression, and the results again show no significant 
change in the remaining coefficients. The last specification (Column 4) reports the results 
after dropping inflation, real interest rate, current account, and capital control index from 
the regression, the results show that the coefficients of lagged FDI, real GDP growth, 
sovereign rating, G-7 real growth rate, and G-7 real interest rate are statistically significant. 
Albuquerque et al. (2005) present an exception to the push-factor literature above, which 
accords with Table 443. In a sample of advanced and emerging economies they found the 
average G3 interest rate negatively affects FDI inflows. Opposite to this result, Gupta and 
Ratha (2000) find that international interest rate has a positive significant impact on FDI 
flows, so the results on push factors in the context of FDI is varied. Given the lower 
significance of push factors in the FDI literature, we do not include further push factors, 
                                               
41 Similar results for the two push factors were obtained in the simpler, published version Emara and El Said (2015). 
42 Cerutti et al. (2017) reached a similar conclusion, holding that the explanatory power of push factors, particularly 
monetary policy, is limited, both in absolute terms, and in relation to pull factors, as is shown above.  
43 Table 4 also showed that the coefficient of the lagged inflation rate shows a statistically insignificant impact on FDI, 
in line with a number of other studies. 
 17 
such as global risk aversion, which is normally highlighted as one of the most important 
push factors but was not found to have an impact on FDI based on the literature.44    
 
    Table 4: FDI & Rating - Parsimonious Model  
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI FDI FDI 
     
FDI it-1 0.412*** 0.419*** 0.434*** 0.428*** 
 (0.125) (0.140) (0.132) (0.140) 
GDP Growth it-1 0.124 0.0671 0.0727 0.0511 
 (0.0857) (0.0811) (0.0863) (0.0760) 
Rating it-1 0.325*** 0.228*** 0.244*** 0.210*** 
 (0.0934) (0.0678) (0.0807) (0.0612) 
Inflation it-1 0.0384  0.00868  
 (0.0384)  (0.0221)  
Real Interest Rate it-1 -0.0102  -0.00643  
 (0.0295)  (0.0238)  
Current Account it-1 -0.0546  -0.0241  
 (0.0899)  (0.0857)  
Capital Control Index it-1 -0.0395** -0.0102   
 (0.0169) (0.00928)   
G-7 Growth it 0.458* 0.404** 0.504** 0.431** 
 (0.236) (0.190) (0.241) (0.185) 
G-7 Real Interest it -0.180 -0.142 -0.321* -0.205* 
 (0.162) (0.120) (0.178) (0.122) 
     
Observations 433 533 479 597 
Number of countries 23 24 23 24 
Arellano-Bond Test:     
Order 1 p-value 0.0943 0.0883 0.0939 0.0867 
Order 2 p-value 0.2223 0.2226 0.2029 0.2079 
Hansen p-value 0.441 0.387 0.117 0.478 
 Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
 
 
The results of Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation in differenced residuals and the 
results of all regressions suggest no autocorrelation in second order. Additionally, the 
Hansen test results confirm that over-identifying conditions are correctly specified.  
In Table 5 we use the parsimonious model and we add a dummy variable for rating that 
takes 1 for investment grade and 0 for speculative grade, where a speculative grade is 
defined as a rating of BBB- or below. As expected, the results show that a movement from 
a speculative to an investment grade increases FDI by about 2.38% as a percent of GDP. 
                                    
                                               
44 Arbatli (2011) found correlation was limited to times of crisis between 2006 and 2008, when FDI inflows declined, 
but the decline was not necessarily VIX related. 
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              Table 5: Investment v.s Speculative Grade: Rating on FD 
                                           Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
                                           Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond  
                                           Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) 
VARIABLES FDI 
  
FDI it-1 0.459*** 
 (0.162) 
GDP Growth it-1 0.120 
 (0.0834) 
Dummy Rating it-1 2.383** 
 (1.132) 
Capital Control Index it-1 0.00837 
 (0.00540) 
G-7 Growth it 0.356** 
 (0.180) 
G-7 Real Interest it -0.0378 
 (0.0881) 
  
Observations 533 
Number of countries 24 
  
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                                   
 
0.0867 
Order 2 p-value                                   0.2075 
Hansen p-value 0.704 
                                                        Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
                                                       and 10% levels respectivelyNumbers in round parentheses (.) are the  
                                                       robust standard errors. 
 
To further analyze the impact of rating on FDI, Table 6 in Appendix I estimates the 
contagion effect of the BRICS countries on the different countries of our sample. The 
BRICS Rating variable is simply a weighted average of the five countries weighted by their 
real GDP. As the results suggest, in all the nine specifications, BRICS as a region exert a 
positive statistically significant contagion effect on EMs in the sample. The results show 
that a one-classification increase in the rating of BRICS countries leads to 2.83% increase 
in the flow of FDI as a percent of GDP for remaining EMs in the sample. 
To analyze how the changes in the rating of one country might affect the flow of FDI 
in other EMs, Table 7 in Appendix I shows that the changes in the rating of each of the five 
BRICS countries has a significant contagion effect on the rest of the EMs. For instance, a 
one-classification increase in the rating of Brazil leads to 0.24% increase in the flow of 
FDI as a percent of GDP for EMs in the sample. This number is equal to 0.13%, 0.22%, 
0.16%, and 0.16% for the case of Russia, India, China, and South Africa, respectively. 
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Next, to study the contagion effect of each BRICS countries on different regions, the 
sample is divided into three regions namely Asia, EMEA, and Latin America. Table 8 in 
Appendix I reports the results of the regional contagious effect for each one of the five 
BRICS countries. As the results show, the changes in sovereign rating in Brazil leads to an 
increase in net FDI inflows to the three regions with the highest increase is in the Asian 
countries where a one-classification increase in Brazil’s rating results in 0.38% increase in 
FDI as a percent of GDP flown to Asian economies.  
Similar to the results of Brazil, Russia’s rating exerts an important contagious impact 
on the flow of FDI to the three regions under analysis. The highest impact is however on 
Asian countries where a one classification increase in Russia’s rating leads to about 0.23 
percent increase in FDI as a percent of GDP and the least impact is on the Latin American 
countries where the same increase in rating leads to only about 0.06% increase in FDI as a 
percent of GDP. In the case of India, a ratings change has a statistical positive significant 
impact on the three regions with the highest contagious effect is on the Asian countries and 
the least on Latin American countries. More specifically, a one-classification increase in 
India’s rating leads to about 0.41% and 0.12% increase in FDI to Asian countries and Latin 
American countries, respectively.  
Similarly, China has a statistically significant regional contagious effect with the 
highest effect on the Asian countries and the least on the Latin American countries. As the 
table shows, a one-classification increase in China’s rating leads to about 0.27% and 0.08% 
increase in FDI to Asian countries and Latin American countries, respectively. Finally, the 
results of South Africa’s regional contagious effect suggest, this country’s rating increase 
has a positive statistically significant impact on the flow of FDI to the three regions with 
the highest impact is on the Asian countries and the least on the Latin American countries. 
More specifically, a one unit increase in the rating index leads to about 0.31% and 0.08% 
increase in FDI to Asian countries and Latin American countries, respectively. Again, for 
all regressions, the Arrelano-Bond test fails to reject the presence of serial correlation of 
order 1 but rejects it for order 2. And the Hansen test confirms that the overidentifying 
restrictions are correctly specified.  
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The last part of the analysis examines the effect of rating variability on FDI flows 
during two crises; global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and country’s crises over the period 
of the study. To measure the total effect of a crisis is calculated as explained in section IV. 
As expected, the results of Tables 9 in Appendix I suggest that the global financial 
crisis of 2007 has an important effect on net inflow of FDI flows to EMs. The computation 
of the total effect of the crises on FDI flows shows a positive and a statistically significant 
coefficient, where a one-classification decrease in the rating leads to about 0.23% decrease 
in FDI during the times of no crisis versus 0.43% in times of the crisis. 
Finally, Table 10 in Appendix I shows the impact of rating in the presence of a country-
specific crisis.45 As the results show, a ratings change has a greater impact on the flow of 
FDI in times of a country’s crisis, to an even greater extent than the impact shown in in 
Table 9, during the global financial crisis. For instance, a one-classification decrease in the 
index results in a reduction in FDI flows by about 0.56% during a country-specific crisis 
respectively, but only 0.23% at other times. Both effects are statistically significant. Once 
again, this confirms the importance of country fundamentals, more than changes in global 
conditions, in affecting FDI flows.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Using dynamic panel System GMM for 24 EMs over the period 1990-2018, the results 
suggest that sovereign ratings are an important factor for the flow of FDI into EMs. For the 
full sample, our estimation results confirm that a one notch increase in sovereign ratings 
leads to about 0.33% increase in FDI as a percent of GDP. Our results for the full sample 
also show that moving from a speculative to an investment grade implies an increase in 
FDI by about 2.38% as a percent of GDP.  
Additionally, analyzing the impact of the change in sovereign debt rating in BRICS 
as a region on the FDI flowing to the non-BRICS EMs, our estimation results shows a 
positive statistically significant impact of the rating changes on the FDI flowing to the non-
BRICS EMs. More specifically, the results confirm that a rating decrease in the BRICS 
region leads to a fall of 0.28% in the FDI flowing to the non-BRICS EMs. Focusing on the 
                                               
45 Such as the Mexican, Asian, or Brazilian crises of the 1990s.  
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impact of the rating of each of the BRICS countries on the rest of the non-BRICS EMS, 
the results show that this effect ranges from 0.13% for Russia to 0.24% for Brazil. 
Additionally, the estimation results also show that the effect of the changes in the 
ratings of each of the five BRICS countries on the non-BRICS EMS divided into three 
regions – Asia, EMEA, and Latin America – the results shows that a rating decrease in 
each of the five BRICS countries displays a negative and statistically significant impact on 
FDI flowing into EMs in all three regions with the highest impact witnessed in Asia. This 
effect ranges from 0.41% for the case of India to 0.23% for the case of Russia.  
Finally, our results show that the presence of a financial crisis, whether country-
specific or otherwise, increases the magnitude of the impact of a sovereign rating change 
on FDI flows. Specifically, a one-notch decrease in sovereign rating during the times of a 
global financial crises crisis reduces FDI inflows relative to the impact during tranquil 
times by about 0.20%. This effect is higher for the presence of a country-specific crisis 
where FDI inflows fall by about 0.56% one-notch decrease in sovereign rating. 
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APPENDIX I  
 
Table 6: BRICS Contagion Effect: Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Rating 
  Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
  Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
        
FDI it-1 0.443*** 0.442*** 0.458*** 0.459*** 0.445*** 0.453*** 0.452*** 
 (0.148) (0.145) (0.144) (0.144) (0.138) (0.129) (0.131) 
GDP Growth it-1 0.178** 0.238** 0.255** 0.262** 0.287** 0.157 0.165 
 (0.0903) (0.111) (0.120) (0.114) (0.127) (0.115) (0.105) 
BRICS Rating it-1 0.170*** 0.182*** 0.183*** 0.190*** 0.253*** 0.283*** 0.283*** 
 (0.0533) (0.0581) (0.0569) (0.0629) (0.0796) (0.0856) (0.0840) 
Inflation it-1  -0.000152 0.000280* 0.000248 0.0182 0.0118 0.00705 
  (0.000181) (0.000165) (0.000160) (0.0332) (0.0360) (0.0420) 
Real Interest Rate it-1   0.0486* 0.0459* 0.0586* -0.00381 -0.00834 
   (0.0268) (0.0252) (0.0311) (0.0324) (0.0290) 
Current Account it-1    -0.0289 -0.0494 -0.0441 -0.0448 
    (0.0958) (0.105) (0.0968) (0.0962) 
Capital Control 
Index it-1 
    -0.0252 
(0.0200) 
-0.0350* 
(0.0210) 
-0.0362* 
(0.0190) 
G-7 Growth it      0.658** 0.637** 
      (0.280) (0.311) 
G-7 Real Interest it       0.0435 
       (0.104) 
Observations 510 464 402 402 341 341 341 
Number of countries 19 19 18 18 18 18 18 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                                  
 
0.0927
 
0.0997 
 
0.1041 
 
0.1029 
 
0.1076 
 
01088 
 
0.1104 
Order 2 p-value 0.2201 0.2194 0.2186 0.2195 0.2256 0.1906 0.1922 
Hansen p-value 0.435 0.505 0.201 0.118 0.720 0.387 0.99 
Notes:   ***, **, * and *’ denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
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Table 7: BRICS Contagion Effect per Countries: Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Rating 
 Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
      
FDI it-1 0.440*** 0.454*** 0.447*** 0.447*** 0.453*** 
 (0.148) (0.157) (0.150) (0.151) (0.148) 
GDP Growth it-1 0.0986 0.103 0.0794 0.0886 0.0808 
 (0.0827) (0.0951) (0.0812) (0.0802) (0.0771) 
Capital Control 
Index it-1 
-0.0141* 
(0.00744) 
-0.00105 
(0.00624) 
-0.00663 
(0.00626) 
-0.00609 
(0.00572) 
-0.00346 
(0.00817) 
G-7 Growth it 0.414** 0.419** 0.420** 0.396** 0.409** 
 (0.199) (0.194) (0.198) (0.191) (0.183) 
G-7 Real Interest it 0.0107 0.171** -0.122 -0.0510 -0.0223 
 (0.0824) (0.0822) (0.101) (0.0896) (0.0769) 
Brazil Rating it-1 0.241***     
 (0.0697)     
Russia Rating it-1  0.131***    
  (0.0341)    
India Rating it-1   0.215***   
   (0.0618)   
China Rating it-1    0.158***  
    (0.0478)  
South Africa 
Rating it-1 
    0.155*** 
Observations 515 515 515 515 515 
Number of 
countries 
23 23 23 23 23 
Arellano-Bond Test      
Order 1 p-value                                                                      0.0916 0.0930 0.0938 0.0934 0.0997 
Order 2  p-value                                                                    0.2261 0.2122 0.2197 0.2159 0.2019 
Hansen p-value 0.345 0.695 0.605 0.493 0.551 
 Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%   levels respectively. 
Numbers in round parentheses (.)  are the robust standard errors. 
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                Table 8: Countries of the BRICS Regional Effect: Sovereign Ratings on FDI  
                Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
                Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Asian EMEA Latin 
Brazil Ratingit-1 0.381** 0.211** 0.129*** 
 (0.154) (0.0837) (0.0210) 
Observations 
Number of countries 
203 
9 
182 
8 
130 
6 
Arellano-Bond Test:    
Order 1 p-value                                                                      0.1105 0.2705 0.0723 
Order 2  p-value                                                                    0.0542 0.3007 0.6533 
Hansen p-value 0.594 0.748 0.883 
Russia Rating it-1 0.228** 0.176** 0.0632*** 
 (0.0937) (0.0687) (0.0117) 
Observations 
Number of countries 
203 
9 
159 
7 
153 
7 
Arellano-Bond Test:    
Order 1 p-value                                                                      0.1157 0.2678 0.0635 
Order 2  p-value                                                                    0.0706 0.2980 0.1820 
Hansen p-value 0.566 0.917 0.413 
India Rating it-1 0.408** 0.195*** 0.118*** 
 (0.158) (0.0730) (0.0316) 
Observations 
Number of countries 
180 
8 
182 
8 
153 
7 
Arellano-Bond Test:    
Order 1 p-value                                                                      0.1140 0.02710 0.0578 
Order 2  p-value                                                                    0.0468 0.2970 0.6101 
Hansen p-value 0.641 0.921 0.871 
China Rating it-1 0.272** 0.139** 0.0826*** 
 (0.115) (0.0552) (0.0273) 
Observations 
Number of countries 
180 
8 
182 
8 
153 
7 
Arellano-Bond Test:    
Order 1 p-value                                                                      0.1096 0.2718 0.0530 
Order 2  p-value                                                                    0.0490 0.2955 0.5442 
Hansen p-value 0.673 0.862 0.923 
South Africa Rating it-1 0.310** 0.185*** 0.0780*** 
 (0.132) (0.0564) (0.0138) 
Observations 
Number of countries 
203 
9 
159 
7 
153 
7 
Arellano-Bond Test:    
Order 1 p-value                                                                      0.1178 0.2772 0.0662 
Order 2  p-value                                                                    0.0540 0.2907 0.4461 
Hansen p-value 0.502 0.971 0.555 
Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
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Table 9: Global Financial Crisis Effect: Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Rating 
    Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI 
   
FDI it-1 0.419*** 0.418*** 
 (0.139) (0.140) 
GDP Growth it-1 0.0695 0.0707 
 (0.0818) (0.0816) 
Rating it-1 0.237*** 0.234*** 
 (0.0716) (0.0707) 
Capital Control Index it-1 -0.00992 -0.00921 
 (0.00926) (0.00945) 
G-7 Growth it 0.366** 0.364** 
 (0.177) (0.176) 
G-7 Real Interest it -0.148 -0.148 
 (0.122) (0.122) 
Crisis Dummy t-1 -0.318 -3.497 
 (0.234) (3.043) 
Crisis Rating Interaction it-1 
 
Total Effect of Rating 
And Crisis 
 0.193 
(0.182) 
0.426* 
(0.221) 
Observations 533 533 
Number of countries 24 24 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                                  
Order 2 p-value 
 
0.0890 
0.2184 
 
0.0885 
0.2094 
Hansen p-value 0.734 0.729 
                                             Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively           
                                             Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
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Table 10 Country’s Crisis Effect: Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Rating 
    Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI 
   
FDI it-1 0.419*** 0.422*** 
 (0.141) (0.142) 
GDP Growth it-1 0.0693 0.0723 
 (0.0837) (0.0836) 
Rating it-1 0.229*** 0.226*** 
 (0.0678) (0.0676) 
Capital Control Index it-1 -0.0103 -0.00970 
 (0.00938) (0.00910) 
G-7 Growth it 0.400** 0.397** 
 (0.190) (0.191) 
G-7 Real Interest it -0.154 -0.169 
 (0.125) (0.128) 
Crisis Dummy t-1 0.590 -3.845** 
 (0.926) (1.689) 
Crisis Rating Interaction it-1 
 
Total Effect of Rating 
And Crisis 
 0.337** 
(0.155) 
0.556*** 
(0.1756) 
Observations 533 533 
Number of countries 24 24 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                                  
Order 2 p-value 
 
0.0887 
0.2211 
 
0.0903 
0.2053 
Hansen p-value 0.625 0.699 
                                               Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%  levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
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Appendix II 
 
Linear Transformation of Sovereign Credit Ratings 
 
Source: Gaillard, N (2009). 
 
Ratings Transformation Methodology 
Using the linear transformations above, we convert a country’s sovereign rating into 
numbers, taking into consideration the day that a ratings change has occurred in addition to 
changes in the outlook (an outlook is either stable, or positive or negative).  Sovereign 
ratings are represented on a scale from 0 (Serial Default) to 22 (AAA), and every change in 
the ratings outlook is given a weight of +0.3 (positive outlook), -3 (negative outlook), and 
                                               
46 Ratings of BBB- and below are classified as speculative- or junk- grade.  
Rating Transformation 
AAA 22 
AA+ 21 
AA 20 
AA- 19 
A+ 18 
A 17 
A- 16 
BBB+ 15 
BBB 14 
BBB-46 13 
BB+  12 
BB 11 
BB- 10 
B+ 9 
B 8 
B- 7 
CCC+ 6 
CCC 5 
CCC- 4 
CC 3 
C 2 
SD 1 
D 0 
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0 (Stable Outlook), and a -0.5 for Negative Watch. The lower value of the positive and 
negative outlook (+0.3/-0.3), implies that a ratings change is possible within three months 
to a year, whereas a Negative Watch implies a more imminent ratings cut within three 
months or less. Hence it has a slightly more weight relative to the Negative Outlook. For 
example, Brazil’s rating changed from BB/Watch Neg to BB/Negative on August 15, 2017. 
That is, its rating stood at 9 with -0.5 for the negative watch, rendering it an 8.5 score for 
the first 15 days of August, and as of August 16, its rating gets numerically adjusted to 9 for 
the rating (BB), and -0.3 for the negative rating outlook, giving it a score of 8.7. On a 
monthly basis, Brazil’s rating would be calculated as follows, 
August 2017 = (8.5*15+8.7*16)/31 
The average monthly rating is divided by the number of days in our month of 
interest. September’s rating- and onwards- would be 8.7 until another ratings change occurs, 
and a similar ratings adjustment occur, with the weighted average rating calculation driven 
by the number of days in the month. After obtaining a monthly series of ratings in numerical 
form, these ratings are averaged (three-months) to obtain quarterly ratings for our 
regressions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
